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Urban Legends and Paranormal
Beliefs: The Role of Reality Testing
and Schizotypy
Neil Dagnall*, Andrew Denovan, Kenneth Drinkwater, Andrew Parker and
Peter J. Clough†
Department of Psychology, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, United Kingdom
Recent research suggests that unconventional beliefs are locatable within a generic
anomalous belief category. This notion derives from the observation that apparently
dissimilar beliefs share fundamental, core characteristics (i.e., contradiction of orthodox
scientific understanding of the universe and defiance of conventional understanding
of reality). The present paper assessed the supposition that anomalous beliefs were
conceptually similar and explicable via common psychological processes by comparing
relationships between discrete beliefs [endorsement of urban legends (ULs) and belief
in the paranormal] and cognitive-perceptual personality measures [proneness to reality
testing (RT) and schizotypy]. A sample of 222 volunteers, recruited via convenience
sampling, took part in the study. Participants completed a series of self-report
measures (Urban Legends Questionnaire, Reality Testing subscale of the Inventory
of Personality Organization, Revised Paranormal Belief Scale and the Schizotypal
Personality Questionnaire Brief). Preliminary analysis revealed positive correlations
between measures. Within schizotypy, the cognitive-perceptual factor was most strongly
associated with anomalistic beliefs; disorganized and interpersonal produced only
weak and negligible correlations respectively. Further investigation indicated complex
relationships between RT, the cognitive-perceptual factor of schizotypy and anomalistic
beliefs. Specifically, proneness to RT deficits explained a greater amount of variance
in ULs, whilst schizotypy accounted for more variance in belief in the paranormal.
Consideration of partial correlations supported these conclusions. The relationship
between RT and ULs remained significant after controlling for the cognitive-perceptual
factor. Contrastingly, the association between the cognitive-perceptual factor and ULs
controlling for RT was non-significant. In the case of belief in the paranormal, controlling
for proneness to RT reduced correlation size, but relationships remained significant. This
study demonstrated that anomalistic beliefs vary in nature and composition. Findings
indicated that generalized views of anomalistic beliefs provide only limited insight into
the complex nature of belief.
Keywords: urban legends, paranormal belief, reality testing, schizotypy
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary/modern urban legends (ULs) are widely circulated, unauthenticated narrative
accounts of rare or bizarre events that convey warnings or cautionary advisements (Guerin, 2003,
2004; DiFonzo and Bordia, 2007). Accordingly, ULs typically contain sensational/dramatic content
intended to prompt strong emotional reactions within recipients (i.e., horror, shock, revulsion, and
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humor) (Heath et al., 2001). The study of ULs is important
academically because they represent enduring social narratives,
which reach wide audiences and potentially influence significant
numbers of people. Indeed, many receivers incorrectly believe
that ULs contain factual material (Brunvald, 1981; Fox Tree and
Weldon, 2007). A commonly cited example is the apocryphal tale
that mature alligators, flushed down the toilet as hatchlings, now
inhabit sewers and pose a threat to urban dwellers (Mullen, 1972).
At a social level, ULs become resistant to abjuration and
persist because of regular retelling. Declarations within ULs,
stating that there is a risk attached to recipients failing to pass
their content on, serve also to facilitate cultural propagation
(Dagnall et al., 2010). Correspondingly, over time, ULs become
part of social record, occupy societal awareness and form part of
public consciousness (Larrington, 2015). Hence, ULs are readily
available and frequently encountered. Furthermore, despite
refutation and counter-evidence, ULs periodically re-surface.
This is particularly true in contemporary society, where email and
social media ensure that ULs circulate indefinitely (Conn, 2008).
Within this self-perpetuating process, narratives evolve and adapt
to accommodate contradictory evidence (Inglis, 2007).
Urban legends possess other important features. Particularly,
themes remain somewhat constant, whilst precise details vary
and adapt (e.g., place names and/or topographical information).
A classic example of this is the existence of campus legends
(Brunvand, 2012). These are generic stories, which adjust to
the characteristics of particular educational institutions (Tucker,
2005). Similarly, content alters over time (e.g., ancient battlefield
stories reference recent or present conflicts) and often embraces
social and technological advancements (computer viruses, global
warning, etc.). These modifications in surface structure ensure
that ULs remain relevant, coherent and significant (Fox Tree and
Weldon, 2007).
To date, relatively few psychological studies have focused
on predictors and correlates of endorsement of ULs (Dagnall
et al., 2010; Drinkwater et al., 2012). This is surprising because
of the social importance of ULs and the fact they share key
psychological features with other more widely researched atypical
beliefs (i.e., paranormal and conspiracy-related ideation). This
view is congruent with recent work on ‘anomalous belief,’
which focuses on the reasons why people accept and endorse
unusual/atypical beliefs, experiences and behaviors as real and
authentic. This perspective originates from the assumption
that anomalous beliefs are those, which contradict orthodox
scientific understanding of the universe and defy conventional
understanding of reality (French and Stone, 2013; Brotherton and
French, 2014).
This classification draws on Irwin’s (2009, pp 16–17)
delineation of paranormal belief as, “a proposition that has
not been empirically attested to the satisfaction of the
scientific establishment but is generated within the non-scientific
community and extensively endorsed by people who might
normally be expected by their society to be capable of rational
thought and reality testing.” In this context, reality testing
(RT) refers to the ability to assess the validity of beliefs and
suppositions via reference to external sources of information.
Thus, RT relies (in part) on the ability to monitor and
distinguish accurately between external and internal sources
of information. Indeed, investigations report that believers
demonstrate a preference for subjective-intuitive thinking style
(vs. rational-analytical) and possess a tendency to report
proneness to RT deficits (Dagnall et al., 2010). For example,
Aarnio and Lindeman (2005) reported that intuitive thinking was
positively associated with belief in the paranormal.
Previous research uses the notion that subjective/personal
experiences guide and structure interpretation of information to
explain belief in the paranormal (Epstein et al., 1996; Wolfradt
et al., 1999). From the believers’ perspective, intuitions and
beliefs are self-evidently valid, and accordingly exempted from
critical scrutiny (Epstein et al., 1996; Stanovich and West,
2000). Concomitantly, participants demonstrating higher levels
of analytic reasoning are less likely to validate supernatural beliefs
(Pennycook et al., 2012).
Cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST, e.g., Epstein, 1990,
1994) embodies these ideas and delineates clearly between
experiential and rational processing. Experiential thinking style
is fast, automatic, holistic and characterized by proneness to
generalization/association. Experiential thinking draws heavily
on previous experience, prefers emotional appeal, and is highly
resistant to change. Contrastingly, rational thinking is slow,
intentional, effortful and logical; conscious cognitive appraisal
mediates decision-making (Epstein, 1990, 1993). CEST provides
a useful framework for explaining belief in the paranormal
(Lasikiewicz, 2016).
In support of a link between intuitive-experiential thinking
and general endorsement of anomalous beliefs, Dagnall et al.
(2010) found that attributes of ULs (truthfulness, retelling,
likelihood, importance, scariness, strangeness, and heard by
others) correlated positively with RT scores and belief in
the paranormal. The best predictor of perceived veracity was
proneness to RT deficits. Overall, findings were consistent with
Irwin’s (2003, 2004) supposition that validation of anomalous
beliefs was associated with intuitive-experiential thinking style
and the failure to subject data (evidence, experiences, thoughts,
etc.) to critical analytical-rational processing. Hence, belief in
ULs may arise from an overreliance on subjective (vs. objective)
evidence.
Considering ULs in the context of Irwin’s definition
of paranormal belief, endorsement of the two phenomena
share important intuitively ‘apparent’ similarities. Firstly, ULs
originate outside the scientific community (their precise origin
is generally unknown) (Harding, 2016). Secondly, narratives
contain dubious, unsubstantiated evidence and their legitimacy
is unattested (Brunvand, 2012). Thirdly, by virtue of widespread
dissemination, people who typically engage in cogent thought
and are capable of RT endorse ULs (Dagnall et al., 2010).
Whilst correspondences suggest significant conceptual
intersection between ULs and paranormal beliefs, research
reveals only a weak to moderate association. For example,
Dagnall et al. (2010) observed a small positive correlation
(r = 0.28), indicating that the constructs shared only 8%
variance. Drinkwater et al. (2012), using the Australian-Sheep
Goat Scale (ASGS; Thalbourne and Delin, 1993) and the Revised
Paranormal Belief Scale (R-PBS; Lange et al., 2000), reported
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common variance ranging between 14 and 30%. This proposes
that other cognitive-perceptual factors (alongside preferential
thinking style) also influence validation of ULs.
The current paper extended previous work by including a
measure of schizotypy alongside proneness to RT deficits. The
addition of schizotypy was useful because it is a factor generally
associated with inclination to odd and unusual beliefs (Barlow
et al., 2009; Darwin et al., 2011). Specifically, schizotypy is a
multidimensional psychological construct comprising cognitive,
perceptual and affective dimensions that represent vulnerability
to schizophrenia-spectrum pathology (Mason and Claridge,
2015). The model of schizotypy developed within different
psychological-related sub-disciplines (e.g., individual differences
and medical traditions). Hence, various definitions exist: the
personality, quasi-dimensional, and fully dimensional models
(Barrantes-Vidal et al., 2015). The quasi-dimensional or disease
model (Rado, 1953; Meehl, 1962) depicts schizotypy as a
milder form of schizophrenia (Goulding, 2004). Contrastingly,
the personality framework developed by Eysenck (1960) views
psychoticism as the upper end of the normality-psychosis
continuum. These approaches are reconciled within the fully
dimensional model (Claridge, 1997), which designates schizotypy
as continuously distributed trait (a form of healthy variation and
predisposition to psychosis) (Goulding, 2004).
Personality-based models are pertinent to the present article
because they advocate relationships between level of schizotypy,
cognitive-perceptual processing and openness to anomalous
beliefs (Dagnall et al., 2010). This view is consistent with
empirical evidence. For example, Simmonds-Moore (2010)
noted that individuals scoring higher on positive schizotypy
possessed stronger belief in anomalous phenomena. Several
studies report similar associations between schizotypy and belief
in the paranormal (Genovese, 2005; Hergovich and Arendasy,
2007; Hergovich et al., 2008). This association, however, varies
as a function of belief type (Irwin and Green, 1998-1999).
Cognitive-perceptual scores correlate with New Age Philosophy
(psychic ability and spiritualism) and interpersonal with belief
in extraordinary life forms and witchcraft. Contrastingly,
disorganization influences evaluation of paranormal experiences
and relates less to belief in the paranormal (Schofield and
Claridge, 2007; Irwin, 2009). The influence of schizotypy extends
also to conspiratorial ideation (Barron et al., 2014; Dagnall et al.,
2015). In support of this, Dagnall et al. (2015) found positive
schizotypy correlated with conspiracist beliefs.
The present paper assessed the notion that unconventional
beliefs were locatable within a generic anomalous belief
category. The veracity of this supposition presupposed that
endorsement of ULs and belief in the paranormal would
highly positively correlate, and that belief types would
relate similarly to cognitive-perceptual factors (proneness
to reality deficits and schizotypy). Whilst parsimonious, the
proposed anomalous classification is somewhat reductionist
and inconsistent with previous evidence. In this context,
evaluation of the model provided a means by which to extend
understanding of unconventional beliefs. This was conceptually
and methodologically important because researchers are
increasingly using the anomalous classification to group
discrete unconventional beliefs. For example, Brotherton and
French (2014) deduced commonality between endorsement of
conspiracy theories and belief in the paranormal. Specifically,
they claimed that conspiracy theories, like other anomalous
beliefs, were associated with reasoning and heuristical bias. This
conclusion, possesses intuitive appeal, but overstates the case.
Considered in the setting of the present study, it was evident
that whilst surface similarities (i.e., defiance of conventional
understanding of reality) suggested overlap between UL
endorsement and belief in the paranormal, preceding work
indicated only modest shared variance (Dagnall et al., 2010;
Drinkwater et al., 2012).
Indeed, careful consideration of the properties of the
constructs showed significant divergence and suggested
differential interactions with cognitive-perceptual factors.
Explicitly, because validation of ULs derives (largely) from
acceptance of unreliable, dubious information as accurate and
authentic, a stronger relationship was anticipated between
endorsement of ULs and the reality monitoring measure
(vs. schizotypy). Contrastingly, since belief in the paranormal is
a broad, diffuse construct, embracing multifarious phenomenon
(traditional religious belief, psi, witchcraft, superstition,
spiritualism, extraordinary life forms, and precognition) the
researchers anticipated stronger associations between belief
in the paranormal and schizotypy (vs. RT). This prediction
was consistent with the observation that schizotypy influences
perception of causality and connectedness. Indeed, positive
schizotypy (as measured by the cognitive-perceptual factor of the
SPQ-B) is associated with illusory causation, particularly magical
ideation (Rominger et al., 2011). These properties were likely to
be particularly attendant with belief in the paranormal because
validation of some facets of paranormal depends on acceptance
of odd and unusual relationships. From this perspective,
the inclusion of schizotypy alongside RT was justified and
appropriate.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Design
A correlational design was used in which (proneness to RT
deficits and schizotypy) were used as predictors of anomalous
beliefs (endorsement of UL truthfulness and belief in the
paranormal). The design extended beyond consideration of
simple linear relationships to include assessment of structural
relationships within measurement models.
Respondents
In total 222 respondents participated in this study, 62 (28%)
males and 160 (72%) females. Mean overall age was 30.77 years
(SD = 11.74), with a range of 16–63 years; male M = 33.00,
range 17–61 years SD = 13.15, female M = 29.9, range
16–63 years SD = 11.06. Respondents included undergraduates
and employees from the Manchester Metropolitan University
(MMU) and members of the wider community. Recruitment
was via emails and posters to university staff/students and
local stakeholders (businesses, leisure, and vocational/sports
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classes). Overall, 60% of respondents were students and 40%
non-students. Exclusion criteria indicated that respondents
should participate only if they were at least 18 years of age and
had not previously completed a previous study on ULs.
Measures
Respondents completed booklets containing the following
self-report measures: Urban Legends Questionnaire (ULQ)
(Dagnall et al., 2010); RT subscale of the Inventory of
Personality Organization (IPO-RT; Lenzenweger et al., 2001),
R-PBS (Tobacyk and Milford, 1983; Tobacyk, 1988; Lange
et al., 2000; Tobacyk, 2004) and the Schizotypal Personality
Questionnaire Brief (SPQ-B, Raine and Benishay, 1995). To
control for order effects counterbalancing rotated scale order
across respondents.
Urban Legends Questionnaire (ULQ)
The ULQ contains seven ULs (Kidney, Cactus, Cookie, Airbag,
Airplane, Ricin, and Sandstorm) based on Fox Tree and Weldon
(2007). Detail within ULs derived from the Snopes online
database1. Each item within the ULQ possesses the same
underlying structure. A narrative outlined the UL in detail (in the
form of a story, email, warning, article, etc.) (cf. Dagnall et al.,
2010). Presentation within the ULQ is similar to that observed
within real world situations (e.g., email, internet, and traditional
media sources). A series of questions followed each narrative.
The opening question, asked whether respondents had heard
the story before and, if so, how many times and where. The
second, assessed whether respondents believed other people in
the United Kingdom had heard the story (heard by others),
1 (almost no one) to 7 (almost everyone). A succeeding item
enquired whether the respondent would retell the story in the
future (retelling), 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (extremely likely). The
third question evaluated whether respondents believed the story
was true (truthfulness), 1 (definitely not true) to 7 (definitely
true). Item four measured the extent to which respondents
thought something similar to that depicted in the narrative could
happen to someone they knew (likelihood), 1 (not at all likely)
to 7 (extremely likely). Question 5 gauged whether respondents
believed it was important to pass on the story (importance), 1
(not at all important) to 7 (extremely important). The penultimate
item ascertained whether the respondent considered the story
frightening (scariness), 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). The final
question asked whether respondents believed the event was out
of the ordinary (strangeness), 1 (ordinary/not at all unusual) to
7 (extremely unusual). Use of the full question set ensured that
respondents engaged fully with individual ULs. For the purpose
of this study, only overall endorsement of truthfulness was of
interest. Thus, UL scores ranged from 7 to 49, with higher scores
indicating greater endorsement.
Reality Testing
The RT subscale of the IPO-RT (Lenzenweger et al., 2001)
is a 20 item, unidimensional, self-report measure, which
assesses proneness to RT deficits. Particularly, “the capacity
1http://www.snopes.com
to differentiate self from non-self, intrapsychic from external
stimuli, and to maintain empathy with ordinary social criteria of
reality” (Kernberg, 1996, p. 120). Responses indicate agreement
to statements on a five-point likert scale (1 = never true,
to 5 = always true). Total scores range from 20 to 100,
with low scores indicating high RT ability. The IPO-RT
focuses on upon information processing style rather than
psychotic symptomology (Langdon and Coltheart, 2000; Irwin,
2004). The subscale possesses established psychometric integrity.
Lenzenweger et al. (2001) report the scale is internally consistent
and temporally stable with non-clinical populations. Indeed, the
IPO-RT has demonstrated decent retest reliability (r = 0.73) and
good construct validity (Lenzenweger et al., 2001).
The Revised Paranormal Belief Scale
(R-PBS) (Tobacyk and Milford, 1983;
Tobacyk, 1988, 2004; Lange et al., 2000)
The RPBS is the most prevalently used self-report measure
of paranormal belief (Irwin, 2004). It is an amended form
of the Paranormal Belief Scale developed by Tobacyk
and Milford (1983) and contains 26-items assessing seven
facets of paranormal belief: traditional religious belief, psi,
witchcraft, superstition, spiritualism, extraordinary life forms,
and precognition. Items on the R-PBS are presented as statements
(e.g., “there is a devil” and “witches do exist”) and participants
respond on a likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 7 (strongly agree), with higher scores reflecting greater
paranormal belief. Summated items produce subscale and
overall scores. Alternatively, purification of the scale to correct
for differential item functioning (arising from age and gender
bias), identified a two factor solution (Lange et al., 2000).
This comprises factors measuring New Age Philosophy (NAP)
and Traditional Paranormal Belief (TPB). NAP contains 11
items measuring belief in psi, reincarnation, altered states, and
astrology, whilst the TPB assesses belief in concepts, such as
the devil and witchcraft (Irwin, 2004). These dimensions reflect
belief functions (individual vs. social) (Lange et al., 2000). NAP
imparts control over external events (Irwin, 1992), whilst TPB
regulates social/cultural factors (Goode, 2000). Recoding in
line with Rasch scaling procedure (Andrich, 1988) produces
scores ranging from 6.85 to 47.72 on NAP and 11.16 to 43.24
on TPB. Despite debate about the nature and number of belief
dimensions contained within the R-PBS (Lawrence, 1995a,b;
Tobacyk, 1995a,b; Lawrence et al., 1997; Tobacyk and Thomas,
1997), the measure is conceptually and psychometrically
satisfactory (Tobacyk, 2004). Particularly, the R-PBS possesses
adequate validity (Tobacyk, 1995a,b, 2004) and good test–retest
reliability (Tobacyk, 2004).
The Schizotypal Personality
Questionnaire (SPQ-B)
The SPQ-B (Raine and Benishay, 1995) is an easy-to-administer
22-item instrument for assessing level of schizotypy. It is a
briefer version of the 74-item SPQ and comprises items from
three subscales: cognitive-perceptual, eight items; interpersonal,
eight items; and disorganized, six items. The SPQ-B correlates
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highly with the full version and features prominently within
published research (Bailey and Swallow, 2004). The present study
employed the SPQ-B because of its brevity. The SPQ-B possesses
psychometric integrity, good internal consistency reliability,
test–retest reliability, and criterion validity (Raine and Benishay,
1995). Raine and Benishay (1995) found the internal reliabilities
of the subscales ranged from 0.72 to 0.80, with a mean of 0.76.
Similarly, Axelrod et al. (2001) observed reliabilities ranging from
(0.74 to 0.76). The SPQ-B contains statements responded to with
“yes” or “no” answers. Yes-responses are totaled to produce an
overall score ranging from 0 to 22; higher scores specify higher
levels of self-reported schizotypy.
Procedure
Potential respondents read the study background information
before deciding whether to participate. This stated that the
research was concerned with beliefs in unusual phenomena
and cognitive-perceptual personality factors. Respondents who
agreed indicated informed consent and received the materials
booklet. Instructions told participants to take their time and
answer questions openly and honestly. The booklet contained five
subdivisions: demographic information (completed first), ULs,
belief in the paranormal, RT and the SPQ-B. Scale order rotated
across respondents.
RESULTS
Justification and General Analytical
Strategy
Data analysis progressed systematically through a series of stages.
Initially, consideration of zero-order inter-measure correlations
specified relationships between variables. Next, confirmatory
factor analysis and composite reliability assessed the adequacy
of measurement models. Finally, structural relationships among
measurement models were tested. Specifically, the degree to
which schizotypy and RT predicted belief in the paranormal and
endorsement of ULs.
Separate analysis of TPB and NAP was undertaken
because, whilst typically related, researchers contend that
these dimensions satisfy distinct functions (Lange et al., 2000).
This approach was consistent with prior research, which
observed dissimilar relationships between dimensions of belief
in the paranormal and cognitive-perceptual factors (Dagnall
et al., 2016b). Analysis tested four models. Model 1 considered
schizotypy in relation to TPB and ULs. Model 2 modified Model
1, replacing TPB with NAP. Model 3 examined RT as a predictor
of TPB and ULs, and Model 4 evaluated RT as a predictor of
NAP and ULs.
Analysis compared data fit and the predictive power of
each model via consideration of several fit indices. These
included chi-square (χ2), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI),
the Standardized Root-Mean-Square Residual (SRMR) and
the Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA).
Chi-square is a widely cited, traditional measure of overall
model fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999). An insignificant result at a
0.05 indicates good model fit (Barrett, 2007). However, with
large sample sizes chi-square typically over-rejects good fitting
models (Tanaka, 1987). This occurs because chi-square is directly
proportional to sample size, independent of the strength of the
relationship between the variables. Accordingly, it is advisable to
consider chi-square alongside other absolute fit indices (Hooper
et al., 2008). In this context, SRMR and RMSEA values of 0.05
and lower indicate good fit; values between 0.06–0.08 signify
acceptable fit; and 0.08–0.10 marginal fit (Browne and Cudeck,
1993). To assist interpretation of RMSEA, this study employed
the 90 confidence interval (CI). CFI was included as a measure of
incremental (or relative) fit. These indices compare the observed
chi-square value to a baseline model. In this context, CFI is less
sensitive to sample size. CFI assumes that all latent variables are
uncorrelated (null model) and compares the sample covariance
matrix with this null model. CFI values above 0.86 imply marginal
fit (Bong et al., 2013), above 0.90 acceptable, and greater than 0.95
good fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999).
Scale Properties and Inter-measure
Correlations
Examination of inter-variable zero-order correlations revealed
that RT correlated significantly with UL and belief in the
paranormal (RPBS, NAP, and TPB) (see Table 1). Belief in
the paranormal and UL were most strongly associated with
the cognitive-perceptual and disorganized factors of schizotypy.
Subsequently, CFA and SEM analyses focused on only the
cognitive-perceptual and disorganized factors.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Prior to testing structural models, measurement scales were
evaluated using research-informed solutions. The UL (Dagnall
et al., 2010) and RT (Lenzenweger et al., 2001) scales are
unidimensional. The RPBS comprises a correlated two-factor
solution (TPB and NAP) (Lange et al., 2000). The SPQ-B
contains three factors: cognitive-perceptual, disorganized and
interpersonal (Raine and Benishay, 1995), although analysis
excluded the interpersonal factor because it correlated (weakly)
with only one belief measure (TPB).
The UL scale reported acceptable data-model fit,
χ2(14, N = 222)= 20.47, p = 0.11, CFI = 0.98, SRMR = 0.03,
RMSEA = 0.04 (CI of 0.01 to 0.08). The correlated RPBS
two-factor model possessed unacceptable fit on all indices but
SRMR, which was acceptable, χ2(103, N = 222) = 697.84,
p < 0.001, CFI = 0.77, SRMR = 0.08, RMSEA = 0.16 (CI of
0.15 to 0.17). This finding was consistent with recent research
demonstrating that the two-factor RPBS model yields marginal or
unacceptable fit (Dagnall et al., 2016a). Data-model fit improved
by allowing specific within-factor errors to correlate (items 8
and 22, 2, 9, and 16, and 7 and 14), χ2(98, N = 222) = 348.19,
p < 0.001, CFI = 0.90, SRMR = 0.05, RMSEA = 0.10 (CI of 0.09
to 0.12).
Byrne (2013) contends that correlating within-item errors is
permissible if a clear rationale exists. In the current study, the
approach was valid because item combinations were consistent
with subscales belonging to the original seven-factor RPBS
solution (Tobacyk, 2004), specifically traditional religious belief
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TABLE 1 | Scale descriptive statistics and correlations.
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(l) C-P 2.65 2.05 0.42∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.80∗∗ 0.65∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.27∗∗
(2) lot 2.90 2.40 0.31∗∗ 0.80∗ 0.33∗∗ 0.10 0.07 0.16∗ 0.11
(3) Dis 1.71 1.71 0.70∗∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.19∗∗
(4) SPQ 7.27 4.76 0.67∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.24∗∗
(5) RT 32.77 9.69 0.41∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.34∗∗
(6) RPBS 44.47 3044 0.89∗∗ 0.87∗∗ 0.28∗∗
(7) NAP 19.76 6.41 0.76∗∗ 0.29∗∗
(8) TPB 21.01 6.07 0.27∗∗
(9) UL 20.38 7.20
C-P, Cognitive-Perceptual; Int, Interpersonal; Dis, Disorganized; SPQ-T, Schizotypy Personality Questionnaire-Total; RT, Reality Testing; RPBS, Revised Paranormal Belief
Scale; NAP, New Age Philosophy; TPB, Traditional Paranormal Belief; UL, Urban Legends; ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.001.
(items 8 and 22), precognition (items 7 and 14) and psi (items 2,
9, and 16). Despite risking capitalization on chance (MacCallum
et al., 1992), this approach aided interpretation. Capitalization
on chance occurs when the characteristics of a sample influence
the modifications performed and consequently, fail to generalize
to other samples or the population. The correlated two-factor
solution for schizotypy indicated acceptable fit on all indices but
CFI, which indicated marginal fit, χ2(74, N = 222) = 133.82,
p < 0.001, CFI = 0.89, SRMR = 0.06, RMSEA = 0.06 (CI of 0.04
to 0.07).
The unidimensional solution for RT reported unacceptable fit
for CFI, whilst for SRMR and RMSEA fit was acceptable and
marginal respectively, χ2(169, N = 222) = 512.67, p < 0.001,
CFI = 0.76, SRMR = 0.07, RMSEA = 0.10 (CI of 0.09 to 0.11).
This finding was consistent with the lack of consensus pertaining
to the underlying structure of RT. Lenzenweger et al. (2001)
proposed a unidimensional structure but found an appropriate
two-factor solution. In addition, Ellison and Levy (2012) reported
poor understanding of IPO psychometric properties and noted
that a satisfactory solution currently does not exist.
Accordingly, performance of exploratory factor analysis (EFA)
with oblique (promax) rotation) recommended an appropriate
model. Byrne (2013) advocates EFA when no strong conceptual
underpinning is present. EFA produced a four-factor solution
(all loadings > 0.4) accounting for 55% of variance. Factor
1 (items 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 16) comprised statements related
to ‘auditory and visual hallucinations’; factor 2 (items 11,
12, 14, 15, 17, 18 and 19) encompassed ‘delusional thinking’
(possessing beliefs contrary to reality); factor 3 (items 4, 10,
13, and 20) assessed ‘social deficits’ (difficulties reading social
cues) and factor 4 (items 1, 3, and 6) corresponded to
sensory/perceptual ‘confusion’ (inability to understand feelings
and sensations). Identification of factors was consistent with
the theoretical underpinnings of RT deficits (Bell et al., 1985;
Caligor and Clarkin, 2010). Factors rotated obliquely in EFA
and strong inter-factor correlations existed (between 0.42 and
0.49), henceforth a high-order four-factor solution was modeled
(Gorsuch, 1983). CFA revealed acceptable data-model fit, χ2(165,
N = 222) = 308.40, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.90, SRMR = 0.06,
RMSEA = 0.06 (CI of 0.05 to 0.07). Subsequently, structural
analyses used this model.
Overall, UL and schizotypy possessed factor solutions
congruent with supporting theory. The RPBS explanation was
consistent with the theoretical underpinning proposed by Lange
et al. (2000), but required within-item error correlations due to
the influence of original subscales. EFA and CFA assessments
of the RT subscale supported a four-factor solution. The
appropriateness of these factorial solutions can be further
determined by examining parameter estimates. Factor loadings
were positive and statistically significant. The majority of items
possessed factor loadings greater than 0.60, meeting the strict
requirements of Hair et al. (1998); all were above the minimum
threshold of 0.32 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).
Composite Reliability
For latent modeling, traditional measures of internal reliability
(e.g., Cronbach’s α) do not typically provide accurate indicators
of scale reliability (Raykov, 2002). For this reason, composite
reliability is preferred. Composite reliability provides a more
rigorous measure of internal consistency, with values above
0.60 regarded as satisfactory (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw,
2000). In the current study, UL, NAP, and TPB demonstrated
satisfactory composite reliability (ρc = 0.69, ρc = 0.73,
and ρc = 0.91, respectively). Cognitive-perceptual reported
composite reliability below 0.60, however, the value was close
to acceptable (ρc = 0.58). Disorganized reported satisfactory
composite reliability (ρc= 0.65), as did all four sub-factors of RT
(ρc= 0.73, ρc= 0.66, ρc= 0.65, and ρc= 0.67, respectively).
Model Test: Schizotypy, Urban Legends,
and Paranormal Beliefs
Model 1 (see Figure 1) produced acceptable to good data-model
fit on all indices but CFI, which indicated marginal fit, χ2(289,
N = 222) = 461.33, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.89, SRMR = 0.07,
RMSEA = 0.05 (CI of 0.04 to 0.06). A comparison of structural
paths between cognitive-perceptual factors and disorganized
schizotypy factors with UL and TPB indicated that cognitive-
perceptual had a significant positive effect on both TPB (β= 0.74,
p< 0.001) and UL (β= 0.26, p= 0.02). Disorganized did not have
a significant effect on TPB (β=−0.09, p= 0.37) or UL (β= 0.12,
p = 0.26). The model accounted for 16% of the variance in TPB
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FIGURE 1 | Model 1: relationships of cognitive-perceptual and disorganized schizotypy factors with traditional paranormal belief and urban legends (ULs). Latent
variables are represented by ellipses; observed variables are represented by rectangles; error of measurement is indicated by ‘e’; ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.001.
and 48% of the variance in UL. Disorganized correlated positively
with cognitive-perceptual (r = 0.51, p < 0.001).
Model 2 demonstrated acceptable fit for CFI and SRMR, and
good fit for RMSEA, χ2(451, N = 222) = 687.46, p < 0.001,
CFI = 0.92, SRMR = 0.07, RMSEA = 0.05 (CI of 0.04 to
0.06). Similar to Model 1, a comparison of structural paths
between cognitive-perceptual factors and disorganized with UL
indicated that cognitive-perceptual had a significant positive
effect on UL (β = 0.27, p = 0.01). Disorganized demonstrated
a non-significant effect on UL (β = 0.21, p = 0.23). In contrast
with Model 1, disorganized had a significant negative effect
on NAP (β = −0.12, p = 0.03) and cognitive-perceptual had
a significant positive effect on NAP (β = 0.84, p < 0.001).
It is unclear why disorganized demonstrated a significant
negative effect, but it is likely due to a confounding effect.
Disorganized demonstrated a positive relationship with NAP
once the cognitive-perceptual path was fixed to zero. Overall,
the analysis supported the superior effect of cognitive-perceptual
on NAP. Model 2 accounted for 12% of the variance in UL and
58% of the variance in NAP. Disorganized correlated positive
correlation with cognitive-perceptual (r = 0.48, p < 0.001).
Model Test: Reality Testing, Urban
Legends, and Paranormal Beliefs
Model 3 (see Figure 2) demonstrated acceptable data-model
fit for CFI and SRMR, and good fit for RMSEA, χ2(457,
N = 222) = 706.29, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.90, SRMR = 0.07,
RMSEA = 0.05 (CI of 0.04 to 0.06). RT had a significant positive
effect on both UL (β = 0.41, p < 0.001) and TPB (β = 0.54,
p < 0.001). Model 3 explained 29% of variance in TPB and 17%
of variance in UL. Model 4 reported acceptable fit for CFI and
SRMR, and good fit for RMSEA, χ2(655, N = 222) = 1016.17,
p < 0.001, CFI = 0.90, SRMR = 0.07, RMSEA = 0.05 (CI of
0.04 to 0.06). Similar to Model 3, RT had a significant positive
effect on both UL (β = 0.41, p < 0.001) and NAP (β = 0.48,
p < 0.001). Model 4 accounted for 23% of variance in NAP and
17% of variance in UL.
CONCLUSION
Findings support the notion that RT and the cognitive-perceptual
factor of schizotypy strongly predict endorsement of UL and
belief in the paranormal (TPB and NAP). Model comparison
based on respective fit indices and predictive power indicated that
schizotypy (Model 1 and 2) and RT models (Model 3 and 4) fitted
well.
Reality testing explained a marginally greater amount of
variance in UL, whilst schizotypy explained more variance
in paranormal beliefs. Partial correlation supported this
conclusion. Cognitive-perceptual and RT related differentially
to endorsement of ULs and belief in the paranormal.
Considering, ULs first. The relationship between RT and UL
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 June 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 942
fpsyg-08-00942 June 7, 2017 Time: 17:30 # 8
Dagnall et al. Urban Legends and Paranormal Belief
FIGURE 2 | Model 4: relationships of reality testing with new age philosophy and urban legends. Latent variables are represented by ellipses; observed variables are
represented by rectangles; error of measurement is indicated by ‘e’; ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.001.
remained significant after controlling for cognitive-perceptual,
r = 0.23, df = 219, p < 0.001. Contrastingly, the correlation
between cognitive-perceptual and UL, controlling for RT, was
non-significant, r= 0.06, df= 219, p < 0.001. In the case of belief
in the paranormal, controlling for measure contribution reduced
correlation size but relationships remained significant. The
association between cognitive-perceptual and RPS, controlling
for RT, was significant, r = 0.31, df = 219, p < 0.001. Similarly,
the correlation between RT and RPBS, controlling for cognitive-
perceptual, was weaker but still statistically significant, r = 0.15,
df= 219, p= 0.013.
DISCUSSION
Proneness to RT deficits and the cognitive-perceptual factor of
schizotypy strongly predicted endorsement of anomalistic beliefs
(ULs and belief in the paranormal). This finding supported
the view that cognitive-perceptual characteristics connected to
positive schizotypy (i.e., magical ideation, odd beliefs, unusual
experiences, and referential thinking) incline individuals toward
validation of unusual beliefs. Generally, results were consistent
with previous research reporting positive associations between
proneness to RT deficits and corroboration of unconventional
beliefs (ULs and the paranormal) (Drinkwater et al., 2012), and
studies delineating relationships between positive schizotypy and
belief in the paranormal (Genovese, 2005; Hergovich et al., 2008;
Dagnall et al., 2010; Dembin´ska-Krajewska and Rybakowski,
2014). Contrastingly, the disorganized and interpersonal aspects
of schizotypy demonstrated only weak and negligible (mainly
non-significant) relationships respectively. These outcomes
were congruent with the supposition that disorganized and
interpersonal factors do not contribute directly to the formation
of paranormal beliefs (Hergovich et al., 2008; Dagnall et al., 2010).
With regard to global cognitive style, there was a strong
positive correlation between RT and the cognitive-perceptual
factor; the measures shared approximately 42% variance.
This relationship represented conceptual overlap and marked
intuitive-experiential thinking style as an attendant feature
of positive schizotypy. Inspection of cognitive-perceptual
characteristics and previous investigations support this notion.
Specifically, studies report a link between referential thinking,
the tendency to find self-relevant meaning within random
events, and belief in the paranormal (King and Hicks, 2009).
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This corresponds with Williams and Irwin’s (1991) proposition
that belief in the paranormal arises from an individual’s attempts
to structure the world in terms of person-centered, magical
causality.
The idea that subjective/personal experiences guide and
structure interpretation of information concurs also with CEST
(Epstein, 1990, 1994). However, there are important issues to
consider when applying and interpreting findings based on
dual-processing models. Dual accounts of cognitive functioning
and personality provide a conceptual framework for explaining
individual differences in information processing style. The
existence of two parallel, but interacting modes of cognition
(analytical-rational and experiential-intuitive) offers a cogent
framework in which to interpret reasoning inconsistencies.
Emergent finding though, must acknowledge the existence of
varying features and properties within individual dual-processing
models.
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory differs from other
dual-process models in important ways (Lu, 2015), which make
it especially applicable to research investigating relationships
between thinking and irrational beliefs/behaviors (Denes-Raj
and Epstein, 1994). Particularly, because CEST evolved from
the application of the dual-processing paradigm to personality
it focuses on ‘thinking style.’ This approach contrasts with
cognitive models, which view processing differences in terms
of separate cognitive constructs (Pacini and Epstein, 1999).
Within CEST, cognitive style denotes a preference for rational or
intuitive processing. More generally, ‘thinking style’ refers to the
use of heuristics to direct information processing (Kozhevnikov,
2007).
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory shares important parallels
with cognitive, dual-processing frameworks that differentiate
between controlled and automatic processing. These delineate the
rational system as slow, effortful and demanding of attention,
whilst the intuitive system is automatic, fast and non-conscious
(Epstein, 2003). Despite apparent similarities, the terminology
employed is not directly comparable. In particular, CEST
is characterized by features that go beyond those typically
considered by equivalent dual-process cognitive models, or
frameworks. For instance, the notion that the experiential
system is emotional and holistic is specific to CEST (Epstein,
1994). In addition, unlike dual-process cognitive accounts, CEST
includes an unconscious system analogous to that outlined in
psychoanalysis (Epstein, 2003).
With reference to CEST and the findings of the present
study, cognitive-perceptual measures were highly correlated.
This reflected the fact that they assessed a broader range
of constructs than those typically captured by the traditional
controlled and automatic processing distinction. Consequently,
inter measure correlations may represent also variations within
the dimensions of rational-experiential thought. This supposition
is consistent with previous work, which denotes difficulties
associated with interpreting and comparing dual-process model
findings. Particularly, definitions between models vary and often
lack precision. Hence, the general dual-processing literature
lacks coherence and consistency (Evans and Stanovich, 2013).
Accordingly, critics argue that findings are frequently explicable
via alternative single-process models (Keren and Schul, 2009;
Kruglanski and Gigerenzer, 2011). For example, Hayes et al.
(2003) argue that there is no empirical support for the existence of
two independent cognitive styles within CEST. They contend that
research supports the view that there is a single bipolar intuition-
analysis information processing system directed by a common
set of principles driven by people’s daily cognitions (Hayes
et al., 2003). Despite these concerns, considerable converging
evidence from a range of psychological sub-disciplines supports
the legitimacy of the dual-processing distinction (Evans and
Stanovich, 2013).
Within the present study, it appears that believers are more
likely to engage in experiential processing and base inferences
about the world on intuition and self-generated perceptions.
Thinking style undermines critical rational processing, which
in turn perpetuates self-validation of beliefs. Thus, CEST
applied to the study of the paranormal can explain why
paranormal beliefs obstruct logical thinking (Wierzbicki, 1985)
and despite limitations, provides a useful theoretical framework
for understanding paranormal belief (Lasikiewicz, 2016).
Whilst endorsement of ULs and belief in the paranormal
appear similarly related to proneness to RT deficits and the
cognitive-perceptual factor, analysis revealed subtle differences.
Particularly, validation of ULs was more strongly associated with
RT, whilst the cognitive-perceptual factor best explained belief
in the paranormal. This observation ran contrary to the notion
that anomalous beliefs arise predominantly from defiance of
conventional understanding of reality (French and Stone, 2013;
Brotherton and French, 2014). Whilst, intuitive thinking style
and proneness to RT deficits is a feature of unconventional
beliefs, it is not a determining characteristic of anomalous beliefs
generally. From a cognitive-perceptual perspective, endorsement
of specific unusual beliefs is associated with a range of variables
and the relative importance of these varies across belief types.
Indeed, within the present study ULs and belief in the paranormal
shared only approximately 8% variance. This figure was similar
to that reported previously by Dagnall et al. (2010). In this
context, it is appropriate to conclude that whilst the size of
relationship between endorsement of ULs and belief in the
paranormal varies as a function of measure, the correlation is
at best moderate (Drinkwater et al., 2012). Additionally, the
findings suggest different combinations of cognitive-perceptual
best explain individual anomalistic beliefs. Therefore, anomalous
beliefs are best approached and understood on a phenomenon-
by-phenomenon basis.
In the case of ULs, proneness to RT deficits may play
a prominent role because authentication derives largely from
uncritical acceptance of unsubstantiated information; essentially,
the reader accepts prima facie evidence as accurate/truthful.
Uncritical acceptance based on emotional rather than rational
appeal is a key feature of intuitive-experiential thinking (Epstein,
1990, 1994). In this sense, the recipient of an UL makes a
judgment about the supposition of alleged causal relationships
based on presented information. Individuals adopting an
analytical-rational processing style are predisposed to critically
consider information (evidence, experiences, thoughts, etc.) and
accordingly more likely to reject ULs (Dagnall et al., 2010).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 June 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 942
fpsyg-08-00942 June 7, 2017 Time: 17:30 # 10
Dagnall et al. Urban Legends and Paranormal Belief
Ratification of general paranormal beliefs differs because it
stems principally from inferring and elucidating connections
between events, occurrences and happenings. The key factor is
generation, justification, and explanation of causal relationships
between random (non-related) factors. Although, it is important
to note that there is empirical evidence in support of paranormal
phenomena (i.e., precognition and premonition, Bem, 2011).
The observation that proneness to reality deficits was a stronger
predictor of endorsement of ULs than belief in the paranormal
was consistent with Dagnall et al. (2010).
The cognitive-perceptual factor may best explain variance
within belief in the paranormal because it is a broader construct.
Paranormal beliefs are more diverse and less homogeneous than
ULs. Specifically, although individual ULs vary in plausibility,
acceptance arises from the same cognitive processes (uncritical
acceptance of unsubstantiated information as accurate) (Dagnall
et al., 2010). In the case of paranormal beliefs, phenomena vary in
both credibility and underlying causation. For example, psi relies
on inferred causation, whilst the existence of some extraordinary
life forms (i.e., ‘Loch Ness Monster’ and ‘Abominable Snowman
of Tibet’) arises more from the internalization of social myths
and pseudo-scientific thought. In this context, the characteristics
subsumed with the cognitive-perceptual factor provide a better
explanation of belief in paranormal phenomena generally
compared to RT. The tendency to focus on general belief, rather
than specific beliefs, reflects factorial inadequacies within the
two main measures (R-PBS and ASGS) and researchers’ general
preference to assess overall belief. Consideration of specific beliefs
would allow subsequent work to test this hypothesis.
Concerning RT, this study provided qualified support for
Irwin’s (2003, 2004) supposition that anomalous beliefs are
associated with an intuitive-experiential thinking (processing
style) and the failure to appraise evidence, experiences and
thoughts to critical analytical-rational processing. It appears
that the importance of thinking style varies as a function of
belief type. Hence, assumptions based on perceived surface
level similarities are limited. For these reasons, further research
needs to assess the degree to which this is true for particular
specific beliefs. Comparable research conducted with schizotypy
concluded that the constructs relationship with paranormal
beliefs and experiences was complex (Irwin and Green, 1998-
1999).
Another useful extension may be to compare endorsement
of unusual, but real and reported events with traditional and
manufactured ULs. For example, it would be interesting to
see whether endorsement rates vary across event types and
if proneness to RT deficits predict response rates. Clearly,
respondents scoring highly should be more likely to endorse
accounts regardless of nature and/or underlying veracity.
Topically, this research could also extend to the consideration
of fake news (widespread disseminate of inaccurate, false and/or
created news).
An important limitation of the present study concerned the
manner in which the IPO-RT assessed RT. Principally, the
scale indexed the subjective evaluation of perceived likelihood
of RT errors. Accordingly, measurement validity relied on
the extent to which IPO-RT items enabled individuals to
distinguish between potential sources of information (internal
vs. external) (Garrison et al., 2017). This approach contrasted
with experimental-based performance measures, which ‘actually’
assess the accuracy of RT; tasks demand that participants
discriminate between perceived and imaged events (Johnson and
Raye, 1981, 1998; Johnson, 1988, 1997).
The distinction between external and internal generated
events is inherent within the broader concept of source
monitoring (Johnson et al., 1993). Specifically, the source-
monitoring framework (SMF) (Johnson et al., 1993; Mitchell
and Johnson, 2009). The SMF postulates that the origins of
thoughts, sensations and memories are not tagged as belonging
to one (vs. another) source. Instead, labels, such as internal or
external, result from an attributional process. Attributions arise
from assumptions about the typical features that characterize
a source. Thus, external designations are more likely if visual,
or other sensory details are associated with recalled material.
Unfortunately, features that generally constitute evidence for a
source are neither absolute, nor infallible. Misattributions arise
as a function of strategic and heuristic/automatic processing
and occur often when retrieved contents possess features that
share commonality with an alternative source (Marsh et al.,
1997). Due to the general and spontaneous nature of RT
decisions, individuals may lack conscious awareness, or insight
into judgment processes and their veracity. This is likely to affect
self-report measure accuracy.
Future work could assess objectively the ability of participants
to make accurate reality monitoring judgments, both in
relation to other established self-report measures and factors
known to produce errors. The inclusion of experimental-based
performance measures is important because they provide an
objective measure against which to assess IPO-RT scores. This
is required because previous research has demonstrated that
self-report measures of a cognitive process do not always
correspond with experimental assessments and/or performance.
For instance, self-report measures of metamemory often fail
to predict mnemonic performance (Sunderland et al., 1986).
If subjective and objective measures of RT do not align, it
will be important to evaluate why this is the case. This is
especially true if observed differences relate also to other
subjective measures. Conceptually, it is important to ensure
thorough understanding of the nature and limitations of RT
procedures and measures. Once established researchers will
be able to determine precisely the degree to which factors
influencing reality monitoring interact with specific anomalous
beliefs.
Another potential limitation within the present study was
the fact that measures demonstrated an element of conceptual
overlap. Particularly, the cognitive-perceptual factor of the SPQ-
B contained items related to odd beliefs or magical thinking
and unusual perceptual experiences, these indexed both belief
in the paranormal and IPO-RT content. For example, two items
evaluating odd beliefs or magical thinking related to paranormal
beliefs. In one instance the correspondence was direct (“Have
you had experiences with astrology seeing the future. UFOs,
ESP, or a sixth sense?”), whilst in the other the link was
indirect and inferential (“Are you sometimes sure that other
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people can tell what you are thinking?”). In the case of the
second item, endorsement would only indicate belief in the
paranormal (presumably extrasensory perception) if the internal
explanation/attribution provided for the perceived phenomenon
referenced the paranormal.
Examination of unusual perceptual experiences items revealed
potential intersection with IPO-RT content (e.g., “Do you ever
suddenly feel distracted by distant sounds that you are not
normally aware of?”). The second unusual perceptual experiences
question potentially indexed both belief in the paranormal
and proneness to RT deficits (“Have you ever had the sense
that some person or force is around you even though you
cannot see anyone?”). Conceptual overlap is inevitable when
related constructs are included within test batteries. In the
present study, whilst associated, the two cognitive-perceptual
measures served different functions. The SPQ-B acted as a
dispositional measure of cognitive-perceptual preference, whilst
the IPO-RT indexed preferential thinking style. Additionally,
theoretically and psychometric both schizotypy and proneness
to RT deficits have been validated as separate, independent
constructs.
Overall, the lack of shared variance between belief measures
together with their differential interactions with cognitive-
perceptible factors provides compelling evidence to reject the
notion that anomalous beliefs are locatable within a generic
category. Future studies may wish to consider construct overlap
when designing studies. This is achievable via psychometric
evaluation of individual items, and/or omission of items where
clear theoretical intersection is evident, providing of course that
this does not damage psychometric integrity.
Findings from the present study were important for myriad
reasons. Firstly, they contribute to the expanding literature
examining relationships between cognitive-perceptual factors
and anomalous beliefs. Secondly, results provided further insights
into the contribution of intuitive thinking style and schizotypy
to the formation and maintenance of anomalous beliefs. Finally,
the paper explored the relationship between proneness to RT
and schizotypy. This was important because the RTS and SPQ-B,
explain difference nuances within anomalous beliefs.
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